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Despite the inherent differences between family and non-family firms and heterogeneity among 
family companies, family involvement is under-researched in organizational studies, which 
limits the generalization of findings and leads to theoretical ambiguity. However, we do not 
know enough about the family firm specific determinants of inter-firm cooperation and how this 
may affect firm performance. Thus, we examine formal and informal cooperative strategies of 
family firms in the tourism and hospitality sector in the metropolitan area of Hamburg 
(Germany) by drawing upon networks and social capital theories and the extant family firm 
literature. Since cooperation is a strategic action which can be influenced by outsiders’ 
perceptions, we do not solely focus on family firm owners’ attitude towards collaboration. 
Instead, we develop propositions about family firms’ cooperative behavior derived from an 
initially conducted online survey with tourism experts. We find support for our propositions that 
tourism experts expect family involvement to drive firms’ cooperative behavior which in turn 
can influence firm performance. Thereby, personal attributes of the cooperation partner seem to 
be more salient in family firms than in non-family firms. 
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Collaborative agreements have been an important component of firms’ strategic management 
since such activities ensure the long-term survival in a highly interconnected global market 
(Rong, Dekker, & Groot, 2010). Firms can benefit from the exchange of resources, knowledge 
and employees as well as from the access to foreign markets, new costumers and technologies. 
Thus, firms are able to reduce risks and achieve their business goals. Inter- firm cooperation can 
help coping with cyclical fluctuations and changes in market conditions (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Strategic decisions with regard to inter-firm cooperation and associated activities may be the key 
in understanding differences between family and non-family firms as well as the heterogeneity 
among family firms. Particularly family firms, which generally rely on long-term relationships 
with trusted partners (Memili, Chrisman, Chua, Chang, & Kellermanns, 2011), might utilize 
cooperation as a strategy tool. Family firms tend to refrain from bundling their unique resources 
with those of other companies. Owing to various reasons, such as their risk-averse nature or the 
confidence in firm strengths, family firms work with partners less frequently than their non-
family counterparts (Roessl, 2005). However, the need to collaborate with partners increased in 
recent years to maintain the competitive- ness of the company in globally interdependent market 
structures. Hence, family firms are pressured to intensify their cooperation activities instead of 
following path-dependent strategies (Rong et al., 2010). Since decisions concerning the 
configuration of cooperation and subsequent actions might have substantial implications for the 
competitiveness of a firm (Ritala & Ellonen, 2010), cooperation issues become a major topic in 
research as well as in practice. However, only few studies focus on family firms’ cooperative 
behavior and its subsequent effects on companies’ strategic orientation and performance. 
 
Our study intends to contribute to the debate on firms’ cooperative behavior and its relevance to 
firm performance by investigating the differences between family and non-family firms, gaining 
insights about disparities between the external and internal perspective, and addressing the 
potential influence channels through which cooperation activities might affect family firm 
performance. Thereby, our purpose is to provide preliminary insights in regards to family firms’ 
cooperative behavior evaluated by industry experts. This assessment should demonstrate which 
determinants are considered as crucial elements for a successful family firm cooperation 
management and might help companies to judge which elements have to be reviewed to enhance 
their cooperation success. Furthermore, we set the agenda for a phenomenon which has been 
under-researched to date in family firm and cooperation research, which might enrich both fields. 
 
To support the development of family firm literature, we ground our analysis on well-established 
concepts in cooperation and family firm literature, but combine the findings from both fields. 
Besides, our methodological approach is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the first attempts 
to evaluate family firms’ cooperative behavior on the basis of not only the self-perception of 
family firm members, but also the external perspective of industry experts. Thus, we apply a 
mixed-method approach to qualitatively illustrate differences between the external and internal 
view on family firms’ cooperation behavior, combined with a quantitative analysis of financial 
aspects to provide some preliminary insights about the cooperation differences between family 
and non-family firms. We initially identified proven experts in the hotel and gastronomy sector 
which were requested to complete a questionnaire. Subsequently, we compared the results with 
the previously developed propositions by drawing upon the extant family firm and cooperation 
strategy literature and discuss possible implications for family firms’ cooperation. Thus, future 
research might benefit from analyzing a sample of different groups of firms to empirically 
examine our findings, especially by comparing the external expert opinion we provide to the data 
collected from family firm owners and managers. 
 
The article is structured as follows: in Section 2, we provide a short review of the literature on 
cooperation and family firm characteristics. Thereby, we focus on the differences between family 
and non-family firms as well as of the different types of cooperation, such as friendship between 
competitors or non-competitors. Sections 3 and 4 present the analyses which consist of the 
theoretical development and propositions with an overview about the methodological 
framework. Based on this analytical part, the results from our qualitative expert interviews and 
the quantitative performance analysis are presented in Section 5. In the following section, we 
match the findings with our propositions and discuss our results before we conclude with a short 
summary and recommendations for future research. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
 
There has been a prominent stream of research on cooperation (see Ritala & Ellonen, 2010 for a 
review). However, variant cooperative strategies among different types of firms are still under 
researched. The focus has been on the impact of cooperative entrepreneurial behavior on the 
development of cooperative structures (e.g., Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), the competitiveness of 
organizations (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998), the cost to enter collaborations (e.g., White, 2005), on 
trust and opportunism (e.g., Lui, Wong, & Liu, 2009), and on the role of individuals such as 
managers in cooperation processes (e.g., Rong et al., 2010). In order to extend this line of 
research, we draw upon cooperation literature, particularly the works by Ingram and Roberts 
(2000) and by Ramayah, Lee, and In (2011). While these studies did not differentiate between 
different groups of companies, we examine the differences between family and non-family firms 
concerning their cooperative behavior. 
 
Generally, family firms’ cooperative strategies have not received much attention in family 
business studies for a long time (except for Niemelae, 2004). Niemelae (2004) provided a model 
of inter-firm cooperation and found that family firms base their cooperation behavior on control 
of activities and resources. Thus, leadership and management capabilities considerably shape the 
unique networking process of family firms. Then, Fueglistaller and Halter (2004) as well as 
Roessl (2005) raised the question whether family and non- family firms differ in their 
cooperative behavior, especially with respect to the potential reasons for family firms’ 
unwillingness to enter into collaborative structures. An influential study about the propensity of 
family firms to join an inter-organizational cooperation has been recently published by Pittino 
and Visintin (2011). The authors combined transaction cost theoretical arguments with elements 
from the resource-based view to examine factors influencing the family firms’ propensity to 
cooperate instead of utilizing hierarchical structures to achieve business success. 
 
Although the interest in the topic has been growing lately, only a few studies explicitly examined 
family firms’ cooperative behavior (e.g., Anderson, Jack, & Dodd, 2005; Gedajlovic & Carney, 
2010; Hadjielias & Poutziouris, 2015; Memili et al., 2011; Roessl, 2005; Spriggs, Yu, Deeds, & 
Sorenson, 2012; Verbeke & Kano, 2010). Previous studies did not qualitatively investigate the 
internal and external factors that may drive the cooperation decisions of family firms. The 
general focus of these studies is on theoretical conceptualization with regard to the influence of 
particular family firm features or empirical analysis of the impact of single attributes, such as 
trust, on cooperation. The investigation is neither in depth in regards to how internal 
circumstances and processes shape family firms’ cooperation decisions nor the differences 
between the external and internal perceptions concerning family firms’ cooperative behavior. 
 
 
Nevertheless, we strongly believe that family firm research benefits from studies on internal and 
external perceptions instead of solely querying the assessment of family firm representatives. 
This particularly applies to cooperation related issues since there are hardly any official 
guidelines or manuals on how to build, develop and maintain cooperative relationships as it is the 
case for several other strategic areas such as finance, controlling or quality management. In 
addition, family firms represent the dominant group of companies worldwide (Hadjielias & 
Poutziouris, 2015) and their strategic decisions are shaped by unique (non-) economic objectives, 
their long-term orientation and the business-family- connection (Lumpkin, Martin, & Vaughn, 
2008). Thus, it is of vital importance to consider family firm characteristics in regards to strategic 
decisions and the performance implications. 
 
3. Development of propositions 
 
In the following, we analyze how family firm specific characteristics idiosyncratically affect the 
number of cooperative agreements and their nature. We differentiate between cooperation with 
competitors and non-competitors as well as with other family and non-family firms. We further 
draw conclusions about the cooperation quality, i.e. the intensity and proximity, of the 
cooperation in question. 
 
3.1. Extent and intensity of cooperation 
 
To develop propositions about family firms’ cooperation behavior, we focus not only on the 
current extent of collaboration, but also on the expected future cooperation intensity. 
 
3.1.1. Family firms and formal cooperation partners 
 
Family firms exhibit particularistic tendencies (Carney, 2005) while engaging in relationships 
with certain business partners. By that, they select cooperation partners who they perceive as 
trustworthy and select out the non-cooperative partners (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Owing to 
the competitive nature of relation- ships among companies within the same industry, family firms 
may not trust competitors and avoid formal cooperation with them. In addition, family firms may 
perceive the need to cooperate less than non-family counterparts do due to their financial 
independence from external stakeholders and their long-term orientation (Lumpkin, Brigham, & 
Moss, 2010; Wennberg, Wiklund, Hellerstedt, & Nordqvist, 2011). These aspects and 
orientations of family firms make it more likely that they will prefer formal cooperation partners 
in other industries who are not competitors. 
 
Moreover, unlike in non-family firms, family firms are characterized by higher levels of 
ownership concentration which has been associated with risk aversion in the family firm 
literature (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002). Indeed, research has shown that family firm owners 
are more prone to be risk-averse (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nikel, & Gutierrez, 2001; Romano, 
Tonewski, & Smyrnios, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) in strategic decision 
making. Given this propensity, family firms are more likely to be conservative in strategic 
decisions that can shape cooperative activities and selection of cooperation partners. Therefore, 
family firms may be reluctant to engage in collaborations in which they do not fully trust their 
transaction partner. In fact, family firms are likely to avoid or minimize exploitation and loss of 
control over their core business, especially in cases where they are not familiar with the owners 
and/or managers of the cooperation partner firm. Since competitors within the same industry may 
impose threats on preserving trade secrets and other know-how, family firms may moreover 
prefer cooperating with non-competitors. For family firms, it might be even more important to 
preserve their tacit knowledge and core competencies since they are more often active in niche 
markets, such as some specialized areas in the hospitality sector, than their non-family 
counterparts (Getz & Carlsen, 2005). Although cooperation with competitors might have the 
potential for mitigating the intensity of competition, family firms are more likely to perceive the 
risk of cooperating with non-competitors to be lower than cooperating with competitors even 
when the latter may have higher potential economic benefits. Family firms do not primarily strive 
to expand the business domain to other fields, but seek to increase their expert knowledge to 
survive as brand leader in their market (Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente, & Castrillo, 2007). 
Thus, we expect that family firms predominantly search for non-competitor cooperation partners 
such as suppliers, purchasers, or subcontractors. 
 
Proposition 1. Family firms cooperate (formally) with non- competitors more than they 
cooperate with competitors within the same industry, unlike non-family firms. 
 
3.1.2. Future relationships with cooperation partners 
 
As Le Breton-Miller and Miller point out (2006, p. 734), family firms intend to maintain a 
linkage between the family and the business, and hence behave in a way that places greater 
priority on the long-term health of the firm than might otherwise be the case. We argue that one 
of the behaviors that promote the long- term health of a firm is the development of a strong 
competitive position within their industries. This sustainability strategy leads them to cooperate 
more with non-competitors. 
 
Even if market requirements, such as the need to expand target groups or sales markets due to the 
increased global competition, leads to more search for new cooperation partners, family firms 
aim at preserving their core business values. Thus, they may not be willing to enter into risky 
collaborative networks, but rather prefer to maintain their independence by engaging in 
partnerships with non-competitors. The longer time horizon derived from an intention for 
continuing family control of the firm can help its leaders avoid managerial myopia, forgo short-
term earnings (James, 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2008; Upton, Teal, & Felan, 2001), and 
direct efforts toward maintaining enduring partnerships with non- competitors and increasing 
those partnerships over time. 
 
Proposition 2. Family firms will aim to increase formal cooperation mostly with non-
competitors, unlike non-family firms. 
 
3.2. Quality of cooperation in family firms 
 
Besides the extent of cooperation, the quality of the inter-firm relationships is of vital importance 
with respect to companies’ cooperation management and performance. Thus, different 
cooperation features, such as friendships ties, information exchange patterns and the 
commitment to joint local initiatives, are considered to develop propositions about family firms’ 
cooperation behavior. 
 
3.2.1 Friendship between members in informal cooperative structures 
 
Although family firms are expected to be less likely to engage in cooperation with competitors 
than non-family firms, limitations in capabilities or the business survival needs may make 
cooperation attractive or inevitable. While Ingram and Roberts (2000, p. 387) show that 
“friendships are more likely between managers who are competitors”, we take family firms’ 
unique characteristics and their business orientation into account. 
 
In such circumstances, we expect family firms to be more likely to exhibit information 
cooperation in the form of friendship with owners and/or managers of other firms (i.e., both 
competitors and non-competitors) more than non-family firms. There are two rea- sons that we 
expect this to be true. First, owing to their penchant for personalism and particularism, family 
firms are likely to have greater discretion in the manner in which their relationships with 
outsiders are structured (Carney, 2005). This discretion increases the odds that a cooperation 
relationship will assume the friend- ship form since its dependence upon relationships is 
consistent with family firms’ advantages in building social capital. Since family firms possess 
social capital grounded in family relationships and they can transfer these resources into the 
business sphere, they might develop higher levels of organizational social capital, for instance 
driven by the firm’s stability over generations or family members’ internal and external 
interactions (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007). Second, in family firms where human and 
social capital lead to competitive advantages over non-family firms (Carney, 2005), relationships 
with cooperation partners are more likely be characterized by dependability, trust, and long-term 
relationships and exchanges (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Williamson, 1985) which are more likely to 
occur in informal cooperation in the form of friendship. Therefore, unlike non-family firms, 
family firms’ relationships with cooperation partners is less likely to be based on dominance, but 
rather on a reputation for win–win collaborative friendship through close and special 
relationships with a particular group of trusted partners (Carney, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). A firm with 
a reputation for trustworthiness (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), which is common among family 
firms since family reputation is tied to business reputation, also facilitates finding informal 
cooperation partners as friends.  
 
Proposition 3. In case of informal cooperation (i.e., friendships with owners and/or managers of 
other firms), family firms are likely to form more friendships with both competitors and non- 
competitors than non-family firms. 
 
3.2.2. Information exchange as benefit of cooperation 
 
Some family firms may face limitations in not only financial or survivability capital, but also 
internal human and social capital when/if there is substantial dependence on the core family, 
especially when family size is minimal and/or qualifications and resources of family firm 
members are limited (Memili, Welsh, & Luthans, 2013). Such limitations may further increase 
the importance and value of the cooperation as a strategic resource while transforming both 
economic and non-economic goals into firm performance. 
Furthermore, in family firms, long-term orientation (e.g., Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), family’s lasting 
involvement and tenure in the business owing to family handcuffs and emotional attachment 
(Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua,  
2012), reciprocal altruism extended to include non-family firm members (Karra, Tracey, & 
Phillips, 2006), and interactions coupled with high quality relation- ships (Pearson & Marler, 
2010), may foster cooperative activities with partners and generate more fruitful outcomes than 
those in non-family firms. Indeed, future generations in mind, family firms have the incentive to 
turn limited resources, such as information exchanges with cooperation partners, into positive 
organizational outcomes. When the cooperation partner is a well-trusted non- competitor, the 
information exchange is expected to be utilized even more effectively and efficiently by family 
firms. This can be ascribed to family firms’ high level of commitment to long-term relationships. 
While Ramayah, Lee, and In (2011) demonstrate that “open and honest communication is the 
cornerstone to trust” (p. 417) in organizations in general, this especially applies to family firms. 
The information exchange is facilitated by family firm members’ personal contacts with other 
business stakeholders and the mutual understanding about business goals and values within these 
long-term partnerships. Thus, communication tends to be a critical component to develop trust 
between partners and as a catalyst for information sharing in long-term cooperation. 
 
Proposition 4. Family firms will benefit more from information exchange than non-family firms 
in both formal and informal cooperation, especially if the cooperation partner is a non-
competitor.  
 
3.2.3. Family firms’ joint initiatives with partners 
 
Zahra (2003) argues that family ownership significantly affects strategic choices of the family 
firm, which may include joint initiatives associated with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
with partners. In line with Zahra’s (2003) argument, Carney (2005) suggests that ownership 
allows family members to have control rights over the use of a firm’s assets and use these rights 
to influence and dominate decision-making processes in family firms. When decision-making is 
centralized among top family members, the ability and willingness to make idiosyncratic 
decisions increase (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjoeberg, & Wiklund, 
2007; Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008). Additionally, ownership gives the 
family the discretion power for the timely generation and implementation of strategic ideas 
(Zahra, 2005). Hence, the decisions concerning the joint initiatives with partners are likely to be 
shaped by the family firm leaders’ primary desires or wishes. 
 
Research investigating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in family firms generally suggest 
that family firm leaders’ greater commitment to the family firm, direct  contact  with  business 
and community partners, proactiveness in nurturing relationships with all stakeholders, long-term 
orientation, involvement in the community, and reputation concerns can facilitate CSR activities 
(Bingham, Dyer, Smith, & Adams, 2011; Déniz & Suárez, 2005; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Memili 
& Welsh, 2014; Uhlaner, Van Goor-Balk, & Masurel, 2004). However, little is known about the 
CSR initiatives of family firms with their cooperation partners. 
 
We expect that the synergies family firms attain through cooperation will be geared toward not 
only firm success and prosperity, but also joint CSR initiatives with partners such as 
strengthening the region as attractive tourism area. Family firms are generally more active in 
social initiatives in their region since they are personally connected to the local community 
(Bingham et al., 2011). Additionally, economic factors play a role in family firms’ joint 
initiatives for regional campaigns with collaboration partners. In order to increase the 
attractiveness for the quality talent in the job market, family firms need to rely on local partners 
facing the same challenges in getting qualified personnel. Thereby, the business background of 
the involved parties is less important than the common purpose. Hence, we expect family firms 
will be more interested in joint initiatives and local cooperation than non-family firms. 
 
Proposition 5.  
 
Compared to their non-family counterparts, family firms place higher value on joint initiatives 
with partners (both competitors and non-competitors) designed to strengthen the region as 
attractive tourist area. 
 
4. Methodological analysis  
 
Since family firm research does not provide a comprehensive examination of firms’ cooperative 
behavior, especially regarding the differences between the internal and external perceptions, we 
intend to set the agenda for this theoretically and practically relevant topic. We apply a mixed-
method approach to show the relationship between family firm status, cooperation behavior and 
firm performance. We therefore combine a qualitative expert survey with quantitative data about 
companies’ economic performance. Thereby, we focus on the explorative part since we intend to 
provide insights regarding the expert opinion on the differences between family and non-family 
firms in terms of cooperative behavior. A subsequent online survey will be sent out to a large 
sample of family firms in a follow-up study to inquire about the internal attitudes toward 
cooperation issues. We hence intend to gain preliminary insights of industry experts at this stage 
that would guide our quantitative study. In addition to the external experts’ opinion and the 
internal view of family firm members, we examine financial data. 
 
4.1. Qualitative analysis: expert survey 
 
Applying mixed-method approach has been increasingly prevalent since it enables researchers to 
increase the scope and use multi-level analyses through the combination of the advantages of 
both methodological strategies (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Thereby, the use of expert 
knowledge gains importance because it provides rich information which cannot be obtained 
through databases or questionnaires. Experts possess profound knowledge about the topic in 
question and they are able to objectively judge processes within firms as an outsider (Bogner, 
Littig, & Menz, 2009). 
 
In our initial expert survey, we developed questions to fit our intention to apply a mixed-method 
approach which has not been applied in previous family business cooperation research. Instead 
of drawing on established frameworks which are best suited for analyses about all companies, we 
adapted our questions to the unique family firm characteristics. Due to the novelty of the 
approach, we aim to provide initial insights about experts’ view on family firm cooperation. 
Thus, polar questions were complemented by those which allow for an evaluation based on 
Likert scales (see Appendix A for the entire questionnaire). This type of sur- vey enables 
researchers to get an overview about the topic. We selected the experts based on the specialty 
areas, the regional anchoring, and the institution they are working for. Thus, we identified the 
experts from tourist associations, chambers of commerce, and expert committees on hotels and 
restaurants in organizations, whose institutions are all located in the metropolitan area of 
Hamburg (Germany). This area has been chosen since it is considered to be one of most 
attractive tourist areas in Germany. Thereby, the city of Hamburg benefits from its cultural 
heritage, while the metropolitan area is renowned for its high recreational value which makes it 
an extremely popular tourist destination. Thus, numerous hotels, gastronomies, and other 
representatives from these sectors reside in Hamburg which leads to a high expertise and 
numerous experts in this region. 
 
By contacting the experts, we received 21 fully completed surveys we could use as basis for our 
discussion to evaluate our propositions. Among the 21 experts, seven are currently working in a 
hotel or restaurant, while four have previous experiences in one of these areas, and ten experts 
never worked directly in the hotel or gastronomy industry. However, the latter group possesses a 
considerable familiarity with all aspects related to tourism since they are leading members of 
associations, interest groups or local institutions active in the hospitality sector. Therefore, they 
are in regular contact with owners, managers and clients from the hotel and gastronomy sector 
and exhibit profound knowledge. Further- more, with respect to gender, twelve participants were 
male and nine female. Thus, the sample composition displays an appropriate proportional 
distribution in terms of personal, regional, and institutional characteristics. 
 
4.2. Quantitative analysis: financial key figures 
 
For the quantitative analysis, we use “dafne database” provided by Bureau van Dijk which 
allocates profound financial information on German companies. Since the database does not 
differentiate between family firms and non-family firms, we apply a family firm definition 
focusing on controlling ownership, family presence in a management, and succession intentions. 
Thus, we base our study on financial data from a final sample of 1488 companies located in the 
metropolitan area of Hamburg. We focus on firms with con- trolling family as major owner 
(family ownership more than 25%), the presence of family managers in the top management 
team, and the presence of intra-family succession intention. Moreover, we investigate companies 
within the hospitality industry where we restrict our sample to companies which are active in 
hotel business and gastronomy including restaurants and catering services. The result section 





In this section, we present the responses for the qualitative expert survey where we gain insights 
regarding the external perceptions concerning differences in family firms’ cooperative behavior. 
In developing our propositions, our focus is on the results from the online survey which are 
combined by the quantitative analysis of key financial figures. 
 
5.1. Qualitative expert survey 
 
 
The responses from the 21 fully completed expert surveys are assigned to our five propositions 
and the main results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
While the group of experts do not uniformly judge whether family firms have more formal 
cooperation agreements with regard to competitors, the majority of ten experts (47.62%) assumes 
that family firms are more prone to collaborate with non-competitors than their non-family 
counterparts. Concerning the intensity to cooperate with both groups of partner companies, the 
higher aver- age value of 4.39 for family firms’ willingness to cooperate with non-competitors 
against an average of 3.89 for competitors also supports the assessment of family firms’ partner 
selection. These findings are in line with Proposition 1 suggesting that family firms formally 
cooperate with non-competitors more than with competitors, unlike non-family firms. 
With respect to the future cooperation intention, the experts also assume that family firms strive 
to increase their collaborations with non-competitors at a higher rate than with competitor firms. 
However, the numerous industry insiders generally predict no difference from non-family firms 
in this regard. Thus, the experts’ evaluation partially confirms Proposition 2, which suggests that 
family firms aim to increase formal cooperation mostly with non- competitors. 
 
Considering informal cooperation, we propose that family firms are generally more inclined to 
collaborate than their non-family counterparts due to closer ties (Proposition 3). This is 
supported by the industry experts. While 13 out of 21 experts (61.90%) reason that owners or 
managers from family firms have more friendship with competitor businesses, 12 out of 21 
experts (57.14%) expect this for amicable relations with non-competitors. Thereby, in cases in 
which family members form friendships with other business owners or managers, more than one 
third of the experts (8/21) state that they favor relationships with other family firms. However, 
the majority of industry experts (57.14%) expect no difference in family firms’ friendships with 
members of family or non-family firms. 
 
Concerning the information exchange, the survey yields that family firms benefit from the 
interaction with collaboration partners, largely regardless of their competitive situation 
(Proposition 4). While nearly all experts (20/21) assume that family firms derive advantages 
from the information exchange with competitors, still more than 75% of the experts (16/21) 
expect benefits from relations to non-competitors. According to the experts, family firms are also 
willing to share their knowledge, but thereby favor a close dialogue with non-competitors 
(average value: 5.00) versus the information exchange with competitor firms (average value: 
4.20). Although proposition 4 is supported by the experts’ assessment, our assumption that the 
potential benefits of family firms’ information exchange with non-competitors are even higher is 
not supported by the experts. 
 
With respect to our Proposition 5 that family firms place higher value on joint initiatives with 
local partners to strengthen the region as attractive tourist area, the experts confirm our 
assumption for both groups, competitors and non-competitors. Almost half of the industry 
insiders (47.62%) state that family firms are more willing to collaborate with companies from the 
same industry than their non-family counterparts. In case of joint initiatives with non- 
competitors, even 57.12% of the experts assume family firms to be more prone to work together 
to increase the attractiveness of the region for tourists. Only with regards to initiatives with the 
government or other local public stakeholders, the experts assume a lower commitment of family 
firms compared to non-family firms. 
 
In sum, our propositions are mostly supported by the experts’ judgments about family firms’ 




5.2. Financial data analysis  
 
Notwithstanding the explorative outline of this paper, we would like to cease the opportunity to 
take a closer look at key financial figures from companies active in the hospitality industry. We 
draw upon stylized facts to highlight possible regions of investigation for financial indicators. 
However, it is not the goal to provide an in depth analysis of the impact of cooperative behavior 
on financial key indicators. In fact, it seems unlikely that differences in cooperation behavior 
between family and non-family firms fully explain potential differences in financial figures 
between the groups. Nevertheless, differences in financial performance may indicate areas for 
future investigation that may be linked to the propositions brought forward. We thus provide 
descriptive statistics targeted at identifying areas of differences between family firms and their 
non- family counterparts, which we in turn relate to potential differences in cooperative behavior 
in the results. For future research, scholars may use the key figures shown and utilize them as 
endogenous variables. We thus equip scholars with testable propositions. 
 
Table 2 depicts the key summary statistics for the indicators chosen. We differentiate between 
family firms and the total sample, which also includes the reference group of non-family firms. 
Overall, we discover about 79% (1180/1488) firms to be family firms. Given that family 
companies are the dominant organizational form in Germany (Klein, 2000), the rather high ratio 
was expected. Nonetheless, and similar to other studies brought forward, this once again 
illustrates the quantitative importance of family firms not only in Germany, but also around the 
world (Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012), and in the hospitality industry 
especially (Getz & Carlsen, 2005; Hauck & Pruegl, 2015). 
 
On average, family firms are slightly younger (ca. 17 years) and less often of listed nature. For 
the latter, we differentiate between single-member companies (= 1), limited non-listed 
companies (= 2), and listed companies (= 3). As measurement of size and asset intensity, we 
chose revenue and balance sum (in thou- sand Euro). Despite the relatively few observations, the 
indication of smaller (less revenue) and less asset intensive family firms in the chosen industry is 
strong. First, the above findings merely indicate firm size. However, on average, smaller size 
may indicate forgone growth potential. Family firm cooperative behavior may in part explain this 
difference. If in fact family firms restrict their (for- mal) cooperative willingness to non-
competitors and family firms, growth potential lying outside the boundaries may not be realized. 
Similarly, we find non-family firms to show higher total amounts of equity–which again 
indicates size. Yet, family companies more- over show higher debt to equity ratios. The latter is a 
parameter often chosen to describe the inclination towards risk (Hiebl, 2012). Family firms are 
expected to opt for high levels of equity to secure independency and thus ultimately control 
(Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). The summary statistics regarding the capital structure of the 
firm hence gives support to this expectation. 
 
To further illustrate this relationship, Fig. 1 shows a Venn diagram that groups the sample into 
family and non-family firms, and companies with high equity ratios (above 6). The sample once 
again splits into 79% family firms. We find 895 (60%) family firms to have equity ratios lower 
than 6. About a quarter of all companies show equity leading capital structures (24%). However, 
the clear majority of these companies are family firms (285/1448 ≈ 19%). The reference group is 
dominated by firms with lower equity ratios (67 versus 241). 
Correspondingly, family firms are further found to be slightly more independent. Here, we make 
use of an independency measure developed by Bureau van Dijk. The indicator categorizes firms 
into twelve classes, reaching from D− (highly dependent), to A+ (highly independent), based on 
the capital structure of the firm. This in turn allows us to expect that formal cooperation, which 
by definition requires cooperating firms to share information and control, is less appreciated by 
family firms. 
 
Though we find no difference in the levels of working capital, family firms show lower levels of 
liquidity. This stands in contrast to the proposed and found longing to stay independent. The 
ratio resembles a company’s ability to pay off its debt. It is thus regarded as a key slack resource 
to provide independency (Altman, 1968). However, and in close relation to the propositions 
brought forward, friendship ties – for example with suppliers – may result in a higher tolerance 
for accounts payable. This in turn could explain lower liquidity ratios and higher levels of 
independency simultaneously. As a further indicator, we use a dummy to see whether the 
company in question is active in the gastronomy sector. Overall, family firms tend to combine 






6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
In our exploratory study, industry experts inform us that there may be differences between 
family and non-family firms in terms of cooperation strategies. They state to expect distinctions 
with respect to the selection of cooperation partners (i.e., competitors versus non-competitors), 
the extent of cooperation (status quo and future expectation), the nature of cooperation (formal 
versus informal), benefits obtained from cooperation (i.e., information exchange), and joint 
initiatives with cooperation partners. 
 
The findings of the financial analyses also provide information about the differences between 
family and non-family firms in terms of equity, debt/equity, independence, and liquidity. 
Specifically, family firms exhibit lower equity, more debt/equity, more independence, and less 
liquidity than non-family firms in hospitality and gastronomy sectors. Financial limitations may 
make cooperative strategies even more important and valuable in family firms for survival in the 
long run. The independence can allow family firms to have unique and creative forms of 
cooperative strategies (e.g., friendships informally) with particular cooperation partners (i.e., 
non-competitors versus competitors), which are in line with our propositions. 
 
Even if the information we got from the experts in the hospitality industry largely coincides with 
our propositions, derived from family firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics, some aspects should be 
subject of discussion. 
 
With respect to our first proposition that family firms favor to enter into formal cooperative 
agreements with non-competitors receive broad support from the family firm literature. Due to 
the financial independence and a higher risk aversion compared to their non-family counterparts, 
family firms strive toward relation- ships with companies from non-competitive industries. 
In line with this observation, family firms aim to increase formal cooperation predominantly with 
non-competitors so that our second proposition is also supported not only by experts’ opinions 
but also by previous family business literature. Even if market requirements might force 
companies to expand their business area, risk and survivability considerations currently still 
exceed the financial urge to broaden the business focus and thereby perhaps jeopardize family 
business values. 
 
Our third proposition that family business owners or managers are more prone to informal 
cooperation (i.e., friendship) might be owing to family firms’ being more open toward 
friendships with any business manager. Regardless of the family firm background, they search 
for business partners interested in the common goal which do not necessarily need to be a short-
term increase in prof- its. However, family firms might also have less business contacts in total 
due to a more sophisticated partner selection process. Even if this selective might lead to steady 
and reliable firm performance in the long run, it can lead to less business contacts. Following 
Ingram and Roberts (2000), this might especially hold true for contacts with non-competitors 
since family firms less frequently search for business opportunities, e.g., partnerships with firms 
from other economic sectors. 
 
As stated in our fourth proposition, family firms benefit from the information exchange in 
already established relationships due to the development of trustworthy, long-term connections 
with business partners. However, some arguments might result in fewer benefits from 
information exchange. Family firms generally desist from an open communication with 
competitors (and sometimes even with non-competitor firms) owing to the fear of losing control 
over their business. With respect to companies’ tacit knowledge, business contacts and 
employees, the risk-averse nature of family firms lowers their inclination to exchange resources 
and knowledge. This might lead to information sharing processes only in cases in which family 
firms expect to gain more than their exchange partner which results either in less contact or 
distrust between the involved parties. 
 
Following our fifth proposition, family firms place higher value on joint initiatives with local 
partners to increase the attractive- ness of the region as a tourist destination, mainly due to the 
sense of responsibility and long-term survivability concerns. Certainly, family firms might have 
less information about collaboration opportunities with external stakeholders since they are less 
likely to engage in searching for partners and prefer their already well- known networks rather. 
Thus, they might have fewer opportunities to engage in joint initiatives. However, family firms 
might be even better connected in their local communities than non-family firms so that the 
argument probably holds true for trans-regional initiatives and potential partners. 
 
In sum, our propositions are predominantly supported by the qualitative expert survey. However, 
variations in family firms’ cooperative behavior can be explained by some of the above dis- 
cussed arguments. 
 
Even if we are not (yet) able to provide information about family firms’ actual cooperative 
behavior, our analyses draw attention to several positive implications, derived from family firms’ 
cooperation strategies. By conducting an explorative online survey with experts from the 
hospitality sector, we demonstrate the differences in firm characteristics that might influence 
companies’ cooperation strategies and subsequently the firm performance. Thus, our analysis 
sets the stage for future studies within the context of the hospitality sector which has been only 
marginally considered in previous family firm research. We seek to combine and com- pare 
findings not only from family and non-family research, but also from external perspective 
(experts) and self-perception (family firms). Based on the assessment from the external 
perspective provided in the current analysis, responses from family firms in the hospitality sector 
should shed light on the differences between the external view and the self-perception of family 
firms. Aside from setting the agenda for this increasingly important topic, our paper enlightens us 
about potential differences between family and non- family firms’ cooperative behavior and 
provides implications for theory and practice. 
 
Moreover, our study will have critical practical implications. Since tourism is an important driver 
of the local economy in Hamburg and a substantial number of the firms in this particular industry 
are family firms exhibiting family firm idiosyncrasies, our research findings can benefit these 
businesses and consultants with long-term success and prosperity in local economies in a broader 
sense by determining their key success (or failure) factors and strategies. 
 
Furthermore, our findings can also help the local government to provide enlightened support for 
family and non-family firms in tourism and hospitality in strategy setting and growth. The cur- 
rent macroeconomic policies in Germany and around the world do not distinguish between 
family and non-family firms despite differences in firm characteristics and unique business 
development needs (Memili, Fang, Chrisman, & De Massis, 2015). Our exploratory study shows 
that family firms in the hospitality sector are indeed distinct from non-family firms in 
economically significant ways. When/if family firm idiosyncrasies are known better, government 
officials or institutions will be able to provide better support pro- grams geared toward successful 
family firm start-up, management, and growth in the long run. 
 
Thus, if family firms can capitalize on family firm strengths and improve negative facets, they 
can achieve trans-generational prosperity through sustainable business systems, contributing to 
local economies. Thereby, family firms’ unique strategies concerning cooperation, might be a 
key driver for family firms’ performance. 
 
Based on our initial findings and as the next step, we are conducting surveys for a comprehensive 
quantitative analysis of how cooperative activities in various forms and extent and other 
strategies affect family firms’ sales, growth, and other performance indicators. We will also 
examine the determinants of cooperative and other strategies (e.g., family firm governance, intra-
family succession intentions, entrepreneurial orientation, long-term orientation, family identity 
branding, and family firm image). By this, our study will contribute to the theoretical 
advancements in het- erogeneity debates in family firm literature as well as the networks and 
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